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This paper combines on-the-job search and human capital theory to
study the coexistence of ￿rm-funded general training and frequent job
turnovers. Although ex ante identical, ￿rms di⁄er in their training deci-
sions. The model generates correlations between various ￿rm character-
istics that are consistent with the data. Wage dispersion exists among ex
ante identical workers because workers of the same productivity are paid
di⁄erently across ￿rms, and because workers di⁄er in their productivity
ex post. Endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation between work
experience and human capital, which yields new insights on wage disper-
sion and wage dynamics.
Keywords: On-the-job search, on-the-job training, general human capi-
tal, pay rate-training contract, wage dispersion, wage dynamics
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Appendix A
A1. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. Case (1): d = 0
v = ￿0 + ￿
Z v
v
v0dF(v0) + ￿F (v)v + ￿vu + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)v




where the second equality follows from integration by part. Rearrange terms to
get
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1Take the derivative with respect to v
d￿0
dv
= (￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿F(v)
= s(v)
> 0;
i.e., ￿0 is strictly monotone in v, hence the mapping from v to ￿0 is one-to-one.
Therefore, ￿0(v) is a well de￿ned function.
Case(2) d = 1 : similar arguments will yield the result that ￿1(v) is a well-de￿ned
function.
A2 Proof for Lemma 2 (The relationship between ￿1(v) and ￿0(v),
from the worker￿ s perspective)
Proof. For a job with (￿0;d = 0)
v = ￿0(v) + ￿
Z v
v
maxfv;v0gdF(v0) + ￿vu + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)v
= ￿0(v) + v ￿ ￿0(v):
For a job with (￿1;d = 1)
v = ￿1 + (1 + g)f￿
Z v
v
max[v;v0]dF(v0) + ￿vu + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)vg
= ￿1 + (1 + g)(v ￿ ￿0(v)):
Equating these two expressions to solve for ￿1, one gets:
￿1(v) = ￿0(v) ￿ g(v ￿ ￿0(v)):
Now, take the derivative of the wage gap Gap(v) = ￿0(v)￿￿1(v) = g(v￿￿0(v))
with respect to v
Gap0(v) = g(1 ￿ ￿
0
0(v))
= g[1 ￿ s(v)]
> 0:










fs(v)v ￿ ￿0(v) + (1 ￿ s(v))pg
= gv + g








0(v))s(v) ￿ [(1 ￿ s(v))p ￿ ￿0(v)]s0(v)g
= g +
g







where I use the following facts: ￿
0
0(v) = s(v), s0(v) = ￿￿F0(v) < 0 and p ￿
￿0(v) > 0: Hence, the joint bene￿t is strictly increasing in v.
A4. Wage cuts over job-to-job transition
The following notations will be used: Let vl
0 be the value of a job without
training such that ￿0(vl
0) = ￿1(vc), that is, vl
0 is the lowest v level such that
there is still a probability of wage cuts on transition. Let v￿
1(v0) denote the value
of a job with training such that the pay rate on this job is equal to the pay rate
on the job without training that o⁄ers value v0 i.e., ￿0(v0) = ￿1 (v￿
1(v0)); and
let v￿￿
1 (v0) = maxfv￿
1(v0);vg:1
Proposition A1. For each worker who works on non-training jobs with
value v 2 [vl
0;vc], there is a chance of wage cuts on transition, and this proba-
bility is given by







for v0 2 [vl
0;vc]: (1)
Proof. A worker hired at a non-training job with value v0 2 [vl
0;vc] will move
to a new job if the new job is of value v0 ￿ v0, which happens with proba-
bility ￿
R v
v0 dF (v0): Among these possible transitions, wage cuts happen when




vc dF (v0): The ratio of these two probabilities gives the
conditional probability of wage cuts given that a transition is observed.
A5 Proof for Proposition 5 (Firms that o⁄er higher v also o⁄er
higher growth rate)








= 0 if g > 0 : (2)
1The values vl
0 and v￿
1(v0) are well de￿ned because of monotonicity of wage functions and
the continuity of the job o⁄er distribution F; the latter will be con￿rmed in Appendix B.
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= 0 if g > 0 :
(3)




= 0 if g > 0 ; (4)
For now, I assume interior solution (the conditions for existence of interior solu-
tion will be discussed below), and determine the relationship between optimal
growth rate and the promised v value. De￿ne




= ￿C0(g)(1 ￿ s(v)) + C0(g)(1 ￿ s(v)) ￿ C00(g)[s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g]
= ￿C00(g)[s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g]
< 0 by convexity of C (￿);
@L
@v
= s(v) + s0(v)v ￿ s0(v)(p ￿ C (g)) ￿ ￿
0
0(v) ￿ C0(g)s0(v)(1 + g)
= s(v) + s0(v)[v ￿ p + C (g) ￿ C0(g)(1 + g)] ￿ s(v)
= s0(v)[v ￿ p + C (g) ￿ C0(g)(1 + g)];
where I use the fact that ￿
0
0(v) = s(v): I need to sign the term [v ￿ p + C (g) ￿
C0(g)(1 + g)], which is of the opposite sign as @L=@v:
From s(v)v + (1 ￿ s(v))[p ￿ C(g)] ￿ ￿0(v) ￿ C0(g)[s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g] = 0;
[v ￿ p + C (g) ￿ C0(g)(1 + g)] =
v ￿ ￿0 (v) ￿ C0(g)
(1 ￿ s(v))
:
From [v ￿ ￿0(v) ￿ C0(g)][1 ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))(1 + g)] + [p ￿ ￿0(v) + g(v ￿ ￿0(v)) ￿
C(g)](1 ￿ s(v)) = 0,
v ￿ ￿0 (v) ￿ C0(g)
(1 ￿ s(v))
= ￿
[p ￿ ￿0(v) + g(v ￿ ￿0(v)) ￿ C(g)]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))(1 + g)]
= ￿
[p ￿ ￿0(v) ￿ C(g)] + g(v ￿ ￿0(v))
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))(1 + g)]
< 0;
where the inequality follow from the fact that the future value of a job o⁄er
is positive, and that pro￿t is positive in equilibrium. Therefore, @L





4Appendix B: Market Equilibrium Analysis
B1. The steady-state unemployment level is
u =
￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿ + ￿
:
The steady-state employment value distribution G(v) can be derived from o⁄er
distribution F(v) by equalizing the ￿ ow-in and ￿ ow-out of G(v), which delivers
the following:
G(v) =
(￿ + ￿)F (v)
￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F (v))
:
Proof. The ￿ ow-in of unemployment comes only from exogenous job destruc-
tion, due to the fact that workers never quit into unemployment in a stationary
environment. The ￿ ow-out of unemployment consists of workers that get a job
o⁄er, which will always be accepted in equilibrium:
u￿ = (1 ￿ u)￿
u =
￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿ + ￿
:
The ￿ ow-in of workers hired at value no greater than v comes only from the un-
employed, while workers ￿ ow out of G(v) because of job destruction, retirement,
or the arrival of a job o⁄er from (1 ￿ F (v)): Therefore,
￿uF(v) = (1 ￿ u)G(v)[￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(v))]
G(v) =
￿uF(v)
(1 ￿ u)[￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(v))]
=
(￿ + ￿)F(v)
[￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(v))]
:
B2. Proof for Lemma 5 (Property of F distribution)
Proof. Step 1: The support of F is bounded below vu, and has upper bound
v that satis￿es
v <
p + ￿(1 + g)vu
(￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g
: (6)
Given p > b > 0, in any equilibrium, ￿rm￿ s pro￿t will be strictly positive: by
o⁄ering d = 0 and ￿ = b, a ￿rm will be able to deliver the value vu to an
unemployed worker, who will accept the o⁄er. Since no worker will accept an
o⁄er lower than vu, in equilibrium, no ￿rm will o⁄er v lower than vu: Moreover,
the hiring rate and the separation rate for the ￿rm that o⁄ers the lowest v are
independent of the exact value of v as long as v is no less than vu: Therefore,
the lower bound for the equilibrium o⁄er distribution v will be vu:
5Consider a worker who is on a job with training and is paid her productivity
for each of her e¢ ciency unit. Her life-time value per-e¢ ciency unit is given by
v = p + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 + g)v + ￿(1 + g)vu
v =
p + ￿(1 + g)vu
(￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g
:
Due to strict positive equilibrium pro￿t, the upper bound of wage must be
strictly less than p, therefore:
v < v:
Step 2: F (v) has no mass point.
Suppose not, there exists v0 2 [vu;v], such that F (v0) > F￿ (v0), this would
imply that Pr(v0 ￿ v0;h) ￿ Pr(v0 < v0;h) for all h, and with strict inequality
for some h:
lim
￿!0+ ￿(d;v0 + ￿)
= lim
￿!0+
p ￿ ￿d(v0 + ￿) ￿ dc




hPr(v0 < v0 + ￿;h)]
=
p ￿ lim￿!0+ ￿d(v0 + ￿) ￿ dc





￿!0+ Pr(v0 < v0 + ￿;h)]
=
p ￿ ￿d(v0) ￿ dc






p ￿ ￿d(v0) ￿ dc






where the third equality follows from the continuity of wage function ￿0(v), and
the inequality follow from the fact that Pr(v0 ￿ v0;h) ￿ Pr(v0 < v0;h) for all
h, with strict inequality for some h: This implies that ￿rms that o⁄er v0 cannot
be maximizing: a contradiction.
Step 3: F(v) has connected support.
Suppose not. There is a gap between (v0,v00) in the support of F(v), where v0
and v00 are in the support. By strict monotonicity of wage function, for any v 2
(v0,v00), ￿d(v0) < ￿d(v00) for d = 0;1: Moreover, since F (v0) = F(v00), and hence,
Pr(v < v0;h) = Pr(v < v00;h) for all h, then:
￿(d;v0) =
p ￿ ￿d(v0) ￿ dc






p ￿ ￿d(v0) ￿ dc






p ￿ ￿d(v00) ￿ dc







B3. Human Capital Distribution
The following notations will be used: Fc = F(vc) is the measure of the non-
training sector; sc = ￿+￿+￿(1￿Fc) is the separation rate for the non-training
sector; D(h) is the steady state measure of all workers with human capital h;
and uDu(h) is the steady state measure of unemployed workers with human
capital h.
Proposition B1. In the steady state, the distribution of human capital is
given by the following: For the lowest human capital level h = 1,
D(1) =
￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc; (7)
uDu(1) =
￿sc
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc: (8)
For all n ￿ 1,
D[(1 + g)n] = D(1)
sc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc yn￿1; (9)
uDu[(1 + g)n] = D(1)
sc￿￿(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fcyn￿1; (10)
where
y =
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: (11)
And for any h= 2 f(1 + g)ng1
n=0
D(h) = 0:
Moreover, the mean human capital in the whole market in the steady state exists
and is ￿nite:
E(h) = D(1)f1 +
sc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)(1 + g)
sc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]
g;
and the mean human capital among unemployed workers is:
E(hju) = Du(1)f1 +
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)(1 + g)
sc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]
g:
Proof. Denote Di(h) as the steady-state distribution of workers with human
capital h within the sector i, where i = u(unemployed), 0(employed without
training), 1(employed with training). Let (h;i) represents the status of a worker
who has human capital h and is in sector i. Denote (1 ￿ u)Gc as the measure
of workers in the non-training sector, i.e., (1 ￿ u)Gc =
P
h Pr(v ￿ vc;h), and
denote (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc) as the measure of workers in the training sector. Since
time is discrete and a worker with (h;1) at the beginning of a period becomes
7(h(1 + g);1) at the end of the period, if she is still employed in the training
sector. Without loss of generality, I will characterize the end-of-period human
capital distribution, beginning-of-period distribution can also be derived in a
similar way.
Unemployment sector: when h = 1, because I am characterizing end-of-period
distribution, the human capital level of workers in the training sector is at least
(1 + g), the in￿ ow of (1;u) is composed only of workers who are laid o⁄ from
the non-training sector with human capital 1 and the new entrants, while the
out￿ ow consists of workers that either retire or ￿nd a job. Equating out￿ ow
with in￿ ow, I get
(￿ + ￿)uDu(1) = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ u)GcD0(1): (12)
For h 2 f(1 + g)ng1
n=1, the in￿ ow of (h;u) consists of workers that are laid o⁄
from either employment sector with human capital h, while the out￿ ow is the
same as before, hence I have:
(￿ + ￿)uDu(h) = (1 ￿ u)GcD0(h)￿ + (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h)￿: (13)
Employment sector without training: for all h, workers with (h;0) leave this
group if they ￿nd a job in the d = 1 sector, or if they leave the market or if they
are laid o⁄, hence separation probability is sc = ￿+￿+￿(1￿Fc). Since workers
in sector d = 1 will never go directly down to sector d = 0 (recall training job
is more valuable than non training job), only unemployed workers will join this
group if they ￿nd a job in this sector:
sc(1 ￿ u)GcD0(h) = ￿FcuDu(h): (14)
Employment sector with training:
(1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(1) = 0:
For h 2 f(1 + g)ng1
n=1, workers in sector d = 1 with h will leave this group
for sure regardless of whether they stay or leave this sector, (if they stay, their
human capital becomes h(1 + g)). Those who were in d = 1 with h
1+g moves
into (h;1) group as long as they stay in the training sector. Workers who were
unemployed or employed in non-training sector with human capital h
1+g will
join this (h;1) group if they ￿nd a job in the training sector.
(1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h) = (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(
h
1 + g









8In the whole economy:
D(1) = uDu(1) + (1 ￿ u)GcD0(1); (16)
and for h 2 f(1 + g)ng1
n=1;
D(h) = uDu(h) + (1 ￿ u)GcD0(h) + (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h): (17)
The relationships between the measure of workers with human capital h in
the unemployment sector, in the non-training sector and in the training sector,
i.e., uDu(h), (1 ￿ u)GcD0(h) and (1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h), would be useful in
deriving the results. These relationships can be shown to be as follows: for




sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc(1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h);
(1 ￿ u)GcD0(h) =
￿￿Fc
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc(1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ Gc)D1(h):
And for h = 1
uDu(1) =
￿sc
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc;
(1 ￿ u)GcD0(1) =
￿Fc
sc uDu(1):
Solving the equations (12) to (17) gives us the distribution as speci￿ed in the
proposition. One can check that this is indeed a distribution because 8h 2 f(1+
g)ng1
n=0, D(h) 2 (0;1) and
P1
n=0 D[(1+g)n] = 1: In particular, limn!1 D[(1+
g)n] = 0 because y 2 (0;1).








(1 + g)nsc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc yn￿1D(1) + D(1)
= D(1)f1 + (1 + g)
sc￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)




The assumption that (1+g)(1￿￿) < 1 guarantees y(1+g) 2 (0;1), and therefore
the expectation is ￿nite. Using the relationship between uDu(:) and D(￿),
one can get the expression of the average human capital among unemployed
workers.2
2More detailed proof is available from the author on request.
9B4. Joint Distribution of Job Values and Human Capital
Proposition B2. The measure of workers with human capital h who are
employed at jobs with values no greater than v is given by:
Case 1. v < vc
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n) =
￿F(v)
s(v)
uDu[(1 + g)n] for n ￿ 0; (18)
where s(v) is the separation rate for ￿rm that o⁄ers value v, i.e.,
s(v) = ￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(v)):
Case 2. v ￿ vc
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = 1) = Pr(v0 ￿ vc;h = 1) =
￿Fc
sc uDu(1);
for n ￿ 1;
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n) =
￿Fc
sc uDu[(1 + g)n]
+




(1 ￿ s(v))m￿1uDu[(1 + g)n￿m]:
Proof. Case 1. v < vc : In steady state, the in￿ ow for Pr(v0 ￿ v;[(1 + g)n])
comes only from the unemployed who have human capital (1+g)n and ￿nd a job
with value lower than v. i.e., ￿F(v)uDu[(1+g)n]: Workers of this group ￿ ow out
due to layo⁄, retirement or ￿nding a better job, i.e., Pr(v0 ￿ v;h)s(v):Equalizing
in￿ ow with out￿ ow, and utilizing the relationship between uDu(h) and D(h)
gives the result.
Case 2 v ￿ vc : Pr(v0 ￿ v;[(1 + g)n]) = Pr(v0 ￿ vc;[(1 + g)n]) + Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿
v;[(1 + g)n]):Notice that the ￿rst term is the measure of workers with human
capital (1+g)n in the non-training sector, i.e., (1￿u)GcD0[(1+g)n]: The in￿ ow
for Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;[(1 + g)n]) comes from workers, unemployed or employed
at lower value jobs, who have human capital (1 + g)n￿1 last period and ￿nd
a job with v0 2 [vc;v]: Moreover, as long as they still stay in jobs within this
range, the workers who had human capital (1 + g)n￿1 last period would also
join this in￿ ow. The out￿ ow is the whole Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;(1 + g)n), because
workers with (vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;(1 + g)n) would either retire, or get laid o⁄, or get
a job better than v, or if they stay in (vc ￿ v0 ￿ v), they would have human
capital(1 + g)n+1: Therefore,
Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;(1 + g)n)
= ￿(F(v)￿Fc)fuDu[(1+g)n￿1]+(1￿u)GcD0[(1+g)n￿1]g+(1￿s(v))Pr(vc ￿









m=1(1 ￿ s(v))m￿1uDu[(1 + g)n￿m];
where the last equality follows from the relationship between uDu(h) and (1 ￿
10u)GcD0(h):
For n = 0, since workers in the training sector have human capital at least as
high as (1 + g) at the end of any period, I have




Given the measure Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n), one can easily obtain the
joint distribution of job values and human capital among employed workers by
dividing the measure Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n) by the measure of all employees
(1 ￿ u):
B5. The cuto⁄ value vc divides the economy into training and non-training
sectors. A worker with very high level of human capital must have been in the
training sector for a long time. The longer she stays in the training sector, the
higher her human capital level is, due to on-the-job training; and the higher her
job value is, due to on-the-job search. However, unemployed workers are the only
in￿ ow for the non-training sector, and layo⁄ occurs with the same probability
for workers regardless of their human capital levels. Therefore, conditional on
being employed in the non-training sector, the job value a worker obtains is not
correlated with her human capital level. This idea is formalized in the following.
Corollary B1 The distribution of job values v conditional on human capital
level h, Pr(v0 ￿ vjh), is ￿rst order stochastically increasing in h for any v ￿ vc,
and is invariant to h for v < vc:
Proof. Part I. I ￿rst derive the conditional distribution of vjh: The conditional
distribution of vjh is the measure of workers with h and employed with job
values no greater than v, divided by the measure of employed workers with
human capital h, and the latter is the measure of workers with h minus the
measure of unemployed workers with h :
Pr(v0 ￿ vjh = (1 + g)n) =
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n)
[D((1 + g)n) ￿ uDu((1 + g)n)]
:
Case 1. v < vc :








for n ￿ 1











11where the second equality follows from the relationship between uDu()and D().
Notice that in this case, the conditional distribution is invariant to h.
Case 2. v ￿ vc
Pr(v0 ￿ vjh = 1) =
Pr(v0 ￿ vc;[(1 + g)n])
[D((1 + g)n) ￿ uDu((1 + g)n)]
= 1:
If an employed worker has human capital 1, she must be employed in the non-
training sector, hence v0 ￿ vc ￿ v for sure.
For n ￿ 1, I have shown earlier that
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n) = Pr(v0 ￿ vc;(1 + g)n) + Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;[(1 + g)n]) (19)
=
￿Fc




(1 ￿ s(v))m￿1(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
sc uDu[(1 + g)n￿m]:
Using the expression for uDu((1 + g)n), for n ￿ m = 0;
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
sc uDu(1) = D(1):
For n ￿ m ￿ 1;
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
sc uDu[(1 + g)n￿m] =
￿D(1)￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc yn￿m￿1;
where
y = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ +
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc :
Notice that y > 1￿￿ ￿￿ > 1￿s(v): Plug the expressions for
(￿+￿+￿)
sc uDu[(1+
g)n￿m] into (19), I have
Pr(v0 ￿ v;h = (1 + g)n) (20)
=
￿Fc
sc uDu[(1 + g)n]
+￿(F(v) ￿ Fc)D(1)f
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)yn￿2






)m￿1 + (1 ￿ s(v))n￿1g:
Notice that for n ￿ 1
[D((1 + g)n) ￿ uDu((1 + g)n)] =
￿D(1)sc(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc yn￿1;
12hence,
Pr(v0 ￿ vjh = (1 + g)n)
=
Pr(v0 ￿ vc;(1 + g)n) + Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ v;(1 + g)n)














(F (v) ￿ Fc)[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]





After some algebraic manipulation,





￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(F (v) ￿ Fc)
sc(￿ + ￿)(y + s(v) ￿ 1)
+






[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]
1 ￿ Fc ￿
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
y ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))
g:
Part II. Show ￿rst order stochastic dominance: From (21), one can see that
the conditional probability is decreasing in n for any v < v if the term in the
curly bracket is positive, since F(v) > Fc and
1￿s(v)
y < 1: I now turn to the
term in the curly bracket
[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]
1 ￿ Fc ￿
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
y ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))
=
[y ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))][sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc] ￿ ￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)
(1 ￿ Fc)[y ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))]
;
where the denominator> 0, using the de￿nition of y, one can show that the
numerator is
[(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ s(v))][sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc] > 0;
where the inequality follows from the fact that (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) > 1 ￿ s(v):
As a result, Pr(v0 ￿ vjh = (1 + g)n) is ￿rst order stochastically increasing in
human capital level h for any v ￿ vc:
B6. Joint distribution of pay rate and human capital
Because conditional on training /non-training, pay rate is strictly increasing
in job value, I can derive the joint and conditional distributions of pay rate and
human capital from those of job value and human capital. The properties of
13latter distributions also apply to the derived ones. In the next corollary, I focus
on the case when parameter values are such that b < ￿1(vc) < ￿0(vc) < ￿1(v),
cases where the ranking of these pay rates is di⁄erent can be analyzed in a
similar way.
Corollary B2 The joint distribution of pay rate and human capital among
employed workers is given by









0 (￿);h = (1 + g)n) (22)









1 (￿);h = (1 + g)n)









0 (￿);h = (1 + g)n)
+ Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ ￿
￿1
1 (￿);h = (1 + g)n)g
The distribution of pay rate ￿ conditional on human capital level h, Pr(￿
0 ￿ ￿jh),
is ￿rst order stochastically increasing in h for any ￿ ￿ ￿1(vc), and is invariant
to h for ￿ < ￿1(vc):
Proof. Conditional on d, ￿d(v) function is strictly increasing in v, hence ￿
￿1
d (￿)
is well-de￿ned for d = 0;1. In cases 1 and 2, there is only one type of ￿rms in the
market o⁄ering the pay rate ￿, and each pay rate corresponds to a unique job
value. As a result, the (￿;h) distribution is the same as (v;h) distribution. In
case 1, ￿ is so low that only ￿rms without training would o⁄er such a pay rate:
In case 2, ￿ 2 (￿0(vc);￿1(v)), ￿ is o⁄ered only by ￿rms with training. When
￿ 2 [￿1(vc);￿0(vc)], the same pay rate is o⁄ered by both types of ￿rms. In this
case, Pr(￿
0 ￿ ￿;h) is composed of Pr(v0 ￿ ￿
￿1
0 (￿);h) from non-training ￿rms,
and Pr(vc ￿ v0 ￿ ￿
￿1
1 (￿);h) from training ￿rms. Given the relationship between
(￿;h) distribution and (v;h) distribution, one can see that (￿jh) distribution
must preserve the ￿rst order stochastic dominance property of (vjh) when the
pay rate ￿ is paid by some training ￿rms.
B7. Proof for Claim 1 (Average Human Capital Level Hired by A
Firm With Value v)
Proof. Recall the de￿nition of l(v) : l(v) = ￿[I(v ￿ vu)uE(hju)+
P
h hPr(v0 <
v;h)], the proof follows from the de￿nition of Pr(v0 < v;(1 + g)n) given in
Proposition 4.


















￿ + ￿ + ￿
s(v)
uE(hju)






(1 + g)n Pr(v0 < v;(1 + g)n)
= uE(hju) +
￿Fc




￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)yn￿2






)m￿1 + (1 ￿ s(v))n￿1g;
where the last equality uses the result from (20): De￿ne X as the constant term




























(1 + g)n￿1yn￿1[1 ￿ (
1 ￿ s(v)
y
)n￿1] + (1 + g)
1 X
n=0
[(1 + g)(1 ￿ s(v))]n￿1
=
(1 + g)X
y ￿ 1 + s(v)
[
1
1 ￿ (1 + g)y
￿
1
1 ￿ (1 + g)(1 ￿ s(v))
] +
1 + g
1 ￿ (1 + g)(1 ￿ s(v))
=
(1 + g)
[(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g]
f
(1 + g)X
[1 ￿ (1 + g)y]
+ 1g:












)m￿1 + (1 ￿ s(v))n￿1g
=
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 + g)
[(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g]scuDu(1) ￿
f
￿￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ Fc)(1 + g)
(1 + g)￿sc(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ g[sc(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿Fc]
+ 1g
=
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 + g)







￿ + ￿ + ￿
sc uE(hju) +
￿(F (v) ￿ Fc)(￿ + ￿ + ￿)(1 + g)
[(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g]sc uE(hju)
=
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)[(1 + g)sc ￿ g]
[(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g]sc uE(hju):
B8. Proof for Proposition 2 (Job o⁄er distribution)
Proof. Using the de￿nitions of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and the average quality of
workers it can hire, there are the following two cases.
If vu ￿ v ￿ vc, d = 0 and
￿(d = 0;v) =
(p ￿ ￿0(v))￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
s(v)2 uE(hju):
Equal pro￿t condition ￿(d = 0;v) = ￿(d = 0;vu) implies:
(p ￿ ￿0(v))(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
s(v)2 =
(p ￿ b)
￿ + ￿ + ￿
; (23)
where I use the fact that ￿0(vu) = b and s(vu) = ￿ + ￿ + ￿: The result follows
immediately from the fact that s(v) = ￿ + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F(v)):
If vc < v ￿ v, d = 1 and
￿(d = 1;v) =
(p ￿ ￿1(v) ￿ c)
s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g
￿
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)[sc(1 + g) ￿ g]
sc[s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g]
uE(hju):
Equal pro￿t condition ￿(d = 1;v) = ￿(d = 1;vc) implies
(p ￿ ￿1(v) ￿ c)
[s(v)(1 + g) ￿ g]2 =
(p ￿ ￿1(vc) ￿ c)
[sc(1 + g) ￿ g]2 (24)
and the result, again, follows from the relationship between s(v) and F(v):
Using the relationship between ￿1(vc), ￿0(vc) and c, one can prove the continuity
of F (￿) by showing F(vc) in (??) is the same as F(vc) in (??):
16B9. Proof for Proposition 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of Market
Equilibrium)
In the following, I lay out the logic in deriving the job o⁄er distribution in
primitives, from which I establish the existence and uniqueness of the market
equilibrium.
1) From the worker￿ s Bellman equations, I get the following relationship
between v and ￿: for non-training job, dv0=d￿ = 1=s(v), where s(v) is the
separation probability. For training jobs, dv1=d￿ = 1=[(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g]:
2) From the equal pro￿t condition, i.e., every ￿rm should get the same pro￿t
as the ￿rm that posts vu, and from the fact that ￿0(vu) = b, I can get the
following distribution: for v < vc,





For v ￿ vc;
(1 + g)s(v) ￿ g = (￿ + ￿ + ￿)
s
p ￿ ￿1(v) ￿ c
p ￿ b
r
(1 + g)sc ￿ g
sc ; (26)
where sc = ￿ +￿ +￿(1￿F (vc)), separation rate for the ￿rm that is indi⁄erent
between training and non-training.
3) Plug (25) and (26) into part 1, I get the following relationship between v
and ￿, where M0 and M1 are constants:
v0(￿) = M0 ￿
2
p
(p ￿ b)(p ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿ + ￿
; (27)
v1(￿) = M1 ￿
2
p
(p ￿ b)(p ￿ ￿ ￿ c)
￿ + ￿ + ￿
r
sc
(1 + g)sc ￿ g
:
At vc, the right-hand side of these two equations should be equal, therefore, I
have
M0(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ 2
p
(p ￿ b)(p ￿ ￿
c
0) (28)
= M1(￿ + ￿ + ￿) ￿ 2
p





(1 + g)sc ￿ g
:
4) Evaluate (25) and (26) at vc, I get the pay rate at vc;
￿
c
0 = p ￿ (
sc
￿ + ￿ + ￿
)2(p ￿ b); (29)
￿
c
1 = p ￿ c ￿
sc[(1 + g)sc ￿ g]
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)2 (p ￿ b):
Plug these into (28), I get the relationship that M0 = M1 ￿ M:
175) Using the de￿nition of vc, i.e., at vc;the worker-￿rm joint bene￿t is equal
to c, and using (29), I get the following:
c = g[M0 ￿ p ￿
sc
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)2(p ￿ b)]: (30)
6) The relationship between v and vu, from the Bellman equation, is the
following:
v =
￿1(v) + ￿(1 + g)vu
(￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g
;
where vu can be derived from (27) as
vu = M0 ￿
2(p ￿ b)
(￿ + ￿ + ￿)
:
Moreover, from (27), I also have
v = M1 ￿
2
p
(p ￿ b)(p ￿ ￿1 (v) ￿ c)
￿ + ￿ + ￿
r
sc
(1 + g)sc ￿ g
;
where ￿1 (v) can be derived from (26)
￿1 (v) = p ￿ c ￿ (
(1 + g)(￿ + ￿) ￿ g
￿ + ￿ + ￿
)2 sc
(1 + g)sc ￿ g
(p ￿ b):
Therefore, I get the following relationship
M1 ￿
2sc[(1 + g)(￿ + ￿) ￿ g]
[(1 + g)sc ￿ g](￿ + ￿ + ￿)2(p ￿ b) (31)
=




(1+g)sc￿g + ￿(1 + g)[M0 ￿
2(p￿b)
(￿+￿+￿)]
(￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g
:
7) With M0 = M1, (30) and (31) are two equations in two unknowns sc
and M: Plugging (30) into (31), I obtain one equation in one unknown: sc.
Solving this equation for sc, I can then back out the whole distribution of v.
Notice that for coexistence of training and non training ￿rms, it is required that
sc 2 (￿ +￿;￿ +￿ +￿), which in turn puts restrictions on parameter values such
as training cost. For parameter values that satisfy this requirement, it can be
shown that the solution sc exists and is unique. For parameter values that do
not satisfy this requirement, the market equilibrium features either universal
training or no training at all (but not both), and the equilibrium can be solved
similarly. Nonetheless, for given parameter values, distribution of v exists and is
unique, which implies the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium.
8) Given the distribution of v, I obtain the D(h) and Pr(v0 ￿ v;h) that are
characterized in Propositions B1 and B2.
Appendix C: E¢ ciency of Training Provision
18Consider a social planner who also faces search frictions and has to decide
the fraction (￿) of jobs with training. In assuming that the social planner is also
subject to search frictions, I concentrate on the e¢ ciency of training provision.
Let A be the social value of a unit of human capital if it is currently employed,
and E be the value if it is currently unemployed. A unit of human capital, while
unemployed, is valuable not only to the worker, but also to the potential ￿rms
that might be matched with the worker in the future. Hence, the social value
of an unemployed unit of human capital is greater than its value to the worker,
i.e., E > vu: The social planner￿ s problem is:3
A = max
0￿￿￿1
f(1 ￿ ￿)[p + ￿E + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)A]
+￿[p ￿ c + ￿(1 + g)E + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 + g)A]g; (32)
where E = b + ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)E:






p ￿ c + ￿(1 + g)E
(￿ + ￿)(1 + g) ￿ g
.
Case 1: if A0 > A1, then ￿ = 0, A = A0;
Case 2: if A0 < A1, then ￿ = 0, A = A1;
Case 3: if A0 = A1, then ￿ 2 [0;1], A = A0 = A1:
The social planner follows a cuto⁄ cost strategy, where the cuto⁄ cost c￿
equalizes A0 and A1:
c￿ = g
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)p + ￿E
￿ + ￿
> g
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)p + ￿vu
￿ + ￿
= B (v): (33)
To be socially optimal, all ￿rms should provide training if c < c￿, no training
should be provided if c > c￿, and when c = c￿, there will be no di⁄erence in
social welfare whether there is training or not.
Proposition 1 In general, market-provided training is ine¢ ciently low. Only
when the cost of training goes above c￿ de￿ned in (33) will the market￿ s result
coincide with the social planner￿ s choice, which is not to provide training.
3A job without training produces p today, and next period the job might be destroyed,
upon which the value becomes E. Since p > b by assumption, the social planner would never
choose to put the worker into unemployment. As a result, if no shock occurs, with probability
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿); the value of one unit of human capital stays at A. For a job with training, the
cost of training c has to be deducted from the current output, but the continuation value is
increased by a factor of (1 + g) as a result of the growth in human capital. In case of a job
destruction, the social value of a unit of human capital becomes E: an unemployed unit of
human capital produces b today. Tomorrow if the worker gets matched with a ￿rm, the value
becomes A; otherwise, it stays at E; provided the worker is still in the market.
19The ine¢ ciency of training provision in the market equilibrium results from
the externality of general training. When a ￿rm chooses between training and
no training, it considers only the fact that increasing human capital will increase
its own production and will provide a cheaper way to keep its promise of v to
the worker (hence implicitly the ￿rm takes vu into account). However, the ￿rm
does not consider that human capital, being general, can also contribute to the
production of other ￿rms should the worker leave this ￿rm. Therefore, the social
bene￿t from human capital accumulation is larger than the ￿rm￿ s bene￿t, which
leads to the ine¢ cient market outcome. This ine¢ ciency result is in line with
previous studies, for example, Stevens (1994).
20